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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : 
- v - : Case No. 19533 
ROBERT EUGENE JONES, " " t 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal was remanded to the District Court for an 
evidentiary hearing on June 17, 1985 by this Court. The hearing 
was to determine whether exculpatory information about the chain 
of custody of the murder weapon was withheld from defendant by 
the prosecutor at trial. This supplemental brief sets forth the 
facts adduced at the January 6, 1986 evidentiary hearing and 
responds to appellant's supplemental brief filed on August 8, 
1986. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Caine and Maurice Richards, defendant's trial 
attorneys, testified at the evidentiary hearing that they never 
saw a police report prepared by Norman Soakai dated August 27, 
1983, just two days prior to trial of this case (R. 1675). Caine 
and Richards, however, knew most of the information contained in 
that report. Richards knew that the murder weapon could not be 
connected to defendant by the police investigator, Norman Soakai 
(R. 1730). Both knew that two known felons, Fridal and Hastie, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had used the murder weapon in armed robberies around the time of 
the murder (R. 1677-78, 1688-89, 1690, 1727, 1739). Both knew 
that a confidential informant, Chris Singleton, had supplied 
information to the police about the location of the murder weapon 
which they knew had been discovered in a pawn shop called the 
"Gift House" (R. 1676, 1679, 1690, 1725). 
Maurice Richards interviewed Chris Singleton who told 
him to talk to Hastie (R. 1726). Hastie told Richards that he 
had a gun but refused to talk about it and said he did not know 
defendant (R. 1727). Although the affidavit for a search warrant 
(State's Exhibit 1, Appendix A) stated that LeeAnn Carter, 
defendant's sister, directed police to Hastie's house and 
indicated that the person living there had the murder weapon and 
was a friend of defendant's, Hastie denied to Richards that this 
was possible and denied any connection with the shooting death of 
Kim Chapman (R. 1727). Neither Soakai nor the prosecutor 
believed Hastie when he told Soakai the same story, however, the 
State was unable to obtain evidence connecting Hastie to 
Chapman's murder (R. 1774, 1821-22, 1826). 
Prior to trial, the prosecutor, Donald Hughes, told 
Richards that he would not attempt to connect the gun to 
defendant at trial (R. 1728). Soakai testified at trial that he 
was unable to connect the gun to defendant (R. 1738, 1777, 1823). 
Caine and Richards were pleased with this and did not cross 
examine Soakai, even though they knew he had the evidence on the 
chain of custody of the gun, because they did not want the jury 
to hear that defendant was connected to known felons, Fridal and 
-2-
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Hastie (R. 1692, 1694, 1695-96, 1738-39). In fact, to have had 
Soakai testify about the ownership of the gun would have 
contradicted defendant's story at trial that the gun was one that 
he purchased and gave to Beverly Olson, one of the victims, when 
they were living together (R. 1702, 1739). 
While the police report prepared by Soakai stated that 
Chris Singleton identified the gun as the murder weapon before 
the ballistics test (R. 1813, 1816, 1818), Officer Terry 
Carpenter testified that she did not say the gun was used to kill 
Chapman (R. 1835-3). Carpenter explained that he was guarding 
Singleton because of threats made to her in another criminal 
investigation (R. 1834) . He discovered that she was related to 
Hastie and that she knew about some armed robberies (R. 1835-36, 
1839). Once Soakai connected defendant to Hastie, and Carpenter 
connected Singleton to Hastie, they put two and two together and 
pressed Singleton for information about the weapon used in the 
robberies (R. 1837-38) . Soakai showed Singleton a picture of 
Chapman's body, she became ill, began crying and finally revealed 
that the gun was pawned by a Michael McDill (R. 1836, 1840-41). 
The prosecutor, Don Hughes, testified that he had an 
open file policy and that he discussed with Caine and Richards 
the chain of custody of the murder weapon (R. 1748, 1752, 1754-
55). Hughes thought the defense knew more than he did about the 
subject since they spoke with the principals personally (R. 1754-
55, 1763-64). Hughes did not feel that he withheld any 
exculpatory information and could not recall having the August 27 
police report that Soakai said was typed on August 29 and given 
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to Hughes on that dayf the morning of trial, at Hughes' request 
(R. 1743, 1762, 1765, 1775, 1826-27). 
The only facts contained in the police report that the 
defense was not aware of were the names of the registered owner 
of the gun and the man who pawned the gun and, that Chris 
Singleton said the gun was the murder weapon (R. 1680, 1688-89, 
1690, 1729). They knew, however, that defendant did not own the 
gun and could not be connected to it (R. 1730) , yet they 
refrained from establishing the gun's true ownership because it 
might connect defendant, in a capital murder case, with known 
felons (R. 1739) . Neither Blarney nor McDill were connected to 
defendant or to the murder of Chapman by Soakai (R. 1776, 1777, 
1824, 1825). Nor was Beverly Olson connected to any of the 
persons who were connected to the gun (R. 1705, 1825). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHERE NO EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE WAS WITHHELD BY THE PROSECUTOR. 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence about the chain of custody of the 
murder weapon and its ownership which denied him a fair trial. 
He bases this assertion on an evidentiary hearing held 
approximately one and one half years after trial in which he 
claims that the evidence revealed suppression of exculpatory 
evidence by the State. Examination of the case law governing the 
non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence and of the evidentiary 
hearing transcript reveals, however, that defendant received due 
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process in this regard.1 
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)r this 
Court said: 
The question as to what duty a prosecutor has 
to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence in 
a criminal case depends on the nature of the 
evidence, whether the defense made a specific 
request for the evidence, whether the evidence 
is perjured, whether the defense knew or, 
using reasonable diligence, should have known, 
about the evidence, and, to a certain extent, 
the conduct of the prosecution. 
608 P.2d at 223. Of course, a criminal trial is ultimately a 
search for the truth and not a contest or game. See State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). Deliberate suppression by 
the State of evidence material to guilt or innocence is a denial 
of due process and evidence that is clearly exculpatory; i.e. 
evidence that, "had it been disclosed, would have created a 
reasonable doubt" of defendant's guilt, must be disclosed even 
absent a request for disclosure by the defendant. Jarrell# 608 
P.2d at 224. Further, the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence 
extends also to evidence within the knowledge of the police or 
other members of the prosecution team. Id. 
Defendant made no specific pretrial request for the 
evidence he now claims was withheld, nevertheless, defendant 
contends that he was entitled to a new trial because the evidence 
was exculpatory and might have allowed him to connect the murder 
1
 Defendant does not specify whether he claims a due process 
violation under the Utah Constitution or the United States 
Constitution. Because he cited federal case law on the issue, 
the State assumes that the Federal Constitution is the basis of 
his claim. All Utah case law cited herein is based on federal 
constitutional analysis. 
-5-
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weapon to one of the victims, Beverly Olson. Interestingly, 
defendant overlooks that Mw]hether the evidence created a 
reasonable doubt must be evaluated in light of the entire record 
as viewed by [this Court]." 608 P.2d at 224. 
The most notable omission from defendant's analysis is 
that the allegedly undisclosed evidence was substantially 
disclosed to him prior to trial. The evidence adduced at the 
-hearing demonstrated that the defense knew that the murder weapon 
was not owned by defendant and could not be connected to him (R. 
1728, 1730). The defense team investigated the gun's background 
by talking to Chris Singleton and Reynold Hastie (R. 1726, 1727). 
They knew that any cross examination of Officer Soakai at trial 
on the gun's ownership would tend to connect defendant to known 
felons and possibly implicate him in other criminal activity (R. 
1692, 1694, 1695-96, 1738-39). 
In spite of this knowledge, or because of it, they 
chose not to cross examine Soakai. The State cannot be held 
responsible for defendant's decision to testify at trial and 
identify the murder weapon as one that he purchased for one of 
the victims in the face of evidence, disclosed both before and at 
trial, that the State could not connect the gun to defendant. 
Defendant apparently wished to prove that the gun was already in 
the Chapman/Olson home because it was in Beverly's possession 
after defendant gave it to her. Responsibility for this strategy 
must fall entirely upon defendant's shoulders where the evidence 
shows he knew the gun was owned by someone else even if, as his 
attorneys claim, he did not know the name of the gun's registered 
owner. 
-6-
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The crucial issue is whether knowledge by defendant of 
the names of the owner and pawner of the murder weapon would have 
created a reasonable doubt of guilt in this case. Defendant did 
not even attempt at the hearing to prove any relationship 
connecting either of his victims to Blarney or McDill. In fact, 
the evidence showed that no one had been able to find any such 
connection (R. 1776, 177, 1824, 1825). Absent this evidence, 
knowing the names of Blarney and McDill would not have created a 
reasonable doubt of guilt. 
Finally, defendant claims that the State should have 
disclosed that Chris Singleton identified the weapon as the 
murder weapon before the ballistics test. This evidence, he 
claims, would have caused him to investigate Chris Singleton's 
connection with the crimes in this case and might have revealed 
something. Again, defendant did not demonstrate that there was 
any connection between Singleton and the crimes or its victims. 
He merely speculates that he might have done some investigation. 
Notably, defense counsel did talk to Chris Singleton (R. 1726) . 
Clearly, her identity was not suppressed. Defendant was not 
precluded from asking her how she came to point out the location 
of the murder weapon. 
Just as clearly, the scenario as depicted by officer 
Terry Carpenter roust have been accurate and explains that defense 
counsel did not pursue Singleton further because they knew all 
that she knew and also understood that it was the police who 
suspected that the robbery weapon of Fridal and Hastie was also 
the weapon used on the victims in this case. Carpenter said he 
-7-
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and Soakai knew Singleton was related to Hastie and that she knew 
about Hastie1s criminal activities. They also knew that 
defendant knew Hastie through information from defendant's 
sister. They pressed Singleton for the robbery weapon in hopes 
that it might also turn out to be the murder weapon in this 
case. Singleton probably only referred to the gun as the murder 
weapon in response to the officers' questions and disclosure of 
their suspicions about defendant's use of the gun. 
Because the evidence defendant claims was suppressed 
was discovered or discoverable by him prior to trialf he was not 
denied due process. Jarrell# 608 P.2d at 223. Moreover, the 
evidence was only exculpatory if it tended to prove someone other 
than defendant shot the victims or that the gun was first wielded 
by Chapman as defendant claims. As a review of the trial 
evidence demonstrates, neither of these scenarios is plausible. 
Defendant admitted to shooting Chapman shortly afterward (R. 696-
97, 704-05 710, 1419), and the path of entry of the bullets and 
location of blood splatters precludes the possibility that 
Chapman held the gun in his right hand or that Beverly hit 
defendant during the struggle as defendant claimed (See Statement 
of Facts, Respondent's Brief at 8). Defendant's contention that 
he was denied due process is therefore, meritless and his 
conviction and the trial court's refusal of a new trial should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this '$£" day of October, 1986. 
^>toilfcti^ ^izp-t/J 
S*(NDRA L. ^ R W 
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Max D. Wheeler 
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' ^ N ' " T H r < J» - ' J l _ C O U H T 
WLBLK C O U N T Y , S ' lATL OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The undersigned being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
That affiant has reason to believe that 
( ) on the person(s) of 
(>3) on t h e p r e m i s e s known a s The Gift House, 120 25th, 
( ) i n t h e v e h i c l e ( s ) d e s c r i b e d a s 
i n t h e C i t y o f Ogden , C o u n t y o f Weber , S t a t e o f U t a h , t h e r e i s now 
c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d a s : 
RC .3f Special handgun, Model 40, 2" b a r r e l , Serial P139058 
and t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e 
( ) was u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d o r i s u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d . 
P 5 h a s b e e n u s e d o r i s p o s s e s s e d w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f b e i n g 
u s e d t o commit o r c o n c e a l t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f an o f f e n s e . 
( ) i s e v i d e n c e o f i l l e g a l c o n d u c t . 
The f a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e g r o u n d s f o r i s s u a n c e o f a S e a r c h W a r r a n t a r e : 
3-11-83, Kin Chapiian vae shot and k i l l e d in a residence at 975 His lop . Beverly Jones vas 
sded lc the assault and Ident i f i ed the suspect as Robert Jones. Robert Jones vas arrestee 
charged v i t h the cr ine . Affiant searched the cr*r>e scene e x t e n s i v e l y but could not locate 
ff.urder veapon. Slugs removed fron both v ic t ims and a l so s lugs found at the scene vere 
ressed by Jin Caskil l of Veber State College Crime Lab vho determined that the trurder weapon 
ors t l i k e l y a .38 c e l l b e r revo lver . On 3-14-83 OPD dispatch received a c a l l froxr an 
:VT.-OUE c a l l e r vhc said that Robert Jones' 6 l s t e r Lee Ann Carter had the ourder weapon. 
Lant telked tc LeeAnr., vhc denied having the gun but 6£ic poss ib ly a fr iend of her brother's 
it have I t . LeeAnr. directed a f f i a n t tc a house In the 200 block of 21st Street vhere Renald 
ic l ived v i t h h i s brother Brent. She Indicated she bel ieved the person vho had the gun vas 
:>:-con fron California and that he vas very dangerous. While a f f i an t vas i n v e s t l g a t i n c a 
•ery at the Warehouse and a l so a robbery at Vince's Pharcacy, I received i n f o m a t i o n fror a 
ider . t i s l inforc*ant that Renald Kastle and h i s brother vere the s u s p e c t s . On 7-19-63 
c t i v e Terry Carpenter of South Ogden F e l i c e Department arrestee Renald Kastie or. drur-
ted charges. Detect ive Carpenter told a f f i a n t that hi? conf ident ia l in ferrant , Michael 
11, pave hln InfonLation that Kenald East ie and h i s brother vere the suspects vhc robbed 
e f s Pharmacy and that they had committed other robberies in the area . I c D l l l t e l e Carpenter 
fo l l ov lng the robberies , East ie gave the gun tc an unident i f ied voman. The voiuar. gave the 
to KcDlll and indicated to hir. that i t vas the gun used tn the robberies and e l s e the s£~~e 
used by Robert Jones in the homicide on 3 H 1 - S 3 . McPill told Carpenter he fcad izvnec the 
at The f-ift Rouse, 120 25th. KcDill gave Carpenter a copy of the pavn s l i p , f 12^61. 
F u r t h e r g r o u n d s f o r i s s u a n c e o f a S e a r c h Warrant a r e a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and 
a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n . ( S e e a t t a c h m e n t ( s ) Puce 1 . .' 
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